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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LINDA ILOTT,
CaseNo.990788-CA

Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH,

Priority No. 15

Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT - APPELLEE
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The instant action comes within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of
the State of Utah under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (1996). On December 1,1999,
this matter was transferred to this Court by the Supreme Court of Utah pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). R. 231-33.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. The duty of a property owner to exercise reasonable care in keeping its
premises safe for business invitees is a duty to inspect for dangerous conditions.
This issue was raised by the defendant's motion for summary judgment. R. 48-49.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This matter was decided below upon the
defendant's motion for summary judgment. Reviewing the trial court's grant of a motion
for summary judgment "includes a determination of whether the trial court correctly

applied governing law, affording no deference to the trial court's determination or
conclusions of law." Burton v. Exam Ctr. Indus. & Gen. Med. Clinic. Inc.. 2000 UT 18,
Tf4, 387 Utah Adv. Rep. 21; Gardner v. Perrv Citv. 2000 UT App 1, ^[6,994 P.2d 811. "In
matters of pure statutory interpretation, an appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling for
correctness and gives no deference to its legal conclusions." Stephens v. Bonneville
Travel Inc.. 935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997).
2. The trial court correctly determined that the defendant was immune due to its
alleged failure to make an adequate inspection.
This issue was raised by the defendant's motion for summary judgment. R. 48-49.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue is considered under the same standard of
review as is the first issue.
3. The defendant is entitled to immunity because the alleged injuries of the
plaintiff arose from a latent defect for which immunity has not been waived.
This issue was raised by the defendant's motion for summary judgment. R. 48-49.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue is considered under the same standard of
review as is thefirstissue.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 Waiver of immunity for injury caused by
negligent act or omission of employee - Exceptions. (1996) (partial)
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope
of employment except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results
from:...

(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or negligent
inspection;...
(17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any public building,
structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement;...
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Linda Ilott filed her complaint against the University of Utah on September 4,
1996. R. 1-13. In it, she alleged that she was injured by the dangerous condition of a.
bleecher seat at Rice Stadium on October 29,1994, and that the University had either
actual or constructive notice of this dangerous condition and was negligent in not
repairing or warning of the danger. R. 2. Defendant filed its motion for summary
judgment on March 24,1998. R. 35-81. After oral argument on May 18,1999 (R. 192),
the trial court entered its Memorandum Decision on July 19,1999 granting the
defendant's motion. R. 210-20. The trial court's Order of Dismissal was filed on August
23,1999. R. 221-22. Plaintiff s notice of appeal wasfiledon September 2,1999. R.
223-24.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On October 29,1994, near the end of a University of Utah football game at Rice
Stadium, Linda Ilott, a business invitee, was injured while she was walking on a wooden
bleacher seat that gave way under her weight. R. 2-3, 59,69-70. Plaintiff testified that
the bleacher appeared to be safe and that there was no outward evidence to indicate that
the wooden bleacher would not support her weight. R. 69-70.
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Each summer before football season begins, the University did a visual and weight
inspection of all of the bleachers and seats in Rice Stadium. University employees were
to walk up and down each row and each aisle in Rice Stadium doing a visual and weight
inspection of every seat and bleacher in Rice Stadium. As part of that inspection,
University employees stood on every bleacher seat and every seat in the Stadium. The
visual and weight inspection was done to locate seats or bleachers which might be a
hazard and/or that needed to be repaired or replaced. Any seats or bleachers which the
inspection determined might constitute a hazard for those attending activities at Rice
Stadium were either replaced or repaired before the next public event in the stadium. A
pre-season inspection was done by the University, including an inspection of the bleacher
seat which Ilott complains about, prior to the 1994 football season. This inspection did
not show that the bleacher seat in question was hazardous, unreasonably dangerous or that
it needed to be replaced. R. 83-84.
Before each game during the football season, University employees made a visual
inspection of each bleacher and seat in Rice Stadium. Again, any bleacher or seat that
was determined might be dangerous was replaced or repaired before the next public
event. Such a pre-game inspection was done before the October 29,1994, football game
at which the plaintiff was injured. R. 84. If the University's inspections had shown any
dangerfromthe wooden bleacher seat in question, it would have been repaired or
replaced before the game. Id.
4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs claim is that the University of Utah failed to exercise reasonable care in
keeping the wooden bleacher that gave way under the plaintiffs weight in a safe
condition. But plaintiff then claims that this cause of action does not involve an
inspection in any manner. Under Utah law, the duty of an owner to a business invitee,
such as the plaintiff, is to make reasonable inspections to discover any dangerous
conditions. Plaintiff does not claim that the University of Utah had actual notice of the
dangerous condition of this particular wooden bleacher, but rather that it should have
known. Such a claim is barred by the defendant's retention of immunity for a claim that
it failed to make an inspection or that it made an inadequate or negligent inspection.
Plaintiffs own testimony was that the wooden bleacher seat in question did not
appear dangerous and that it seemed safe and capable of supporting her weight.
Defendant performed ongoing inspections of the seating in Rice Stadium to discover any
dangerous conditions and remedy them. The evidence before the trial court was
undisputed that the defective condition of the wooden bleacher seat in question was a
latent defect for which the University of Utah has retained its immunity.
ARGUMENT
I. THE UNIVERSITY'S DUTY THAT ILOTT CLAIMS
WAS VIOLATED WAS A DUTY TO INSPECT
Plaintiffs claim that no duty to inspect on the part of the University is contained in
her cause of action is based on a misperception of Utah law. Ilott correctly states that the
5

standard of care for an owner of land to a business invitee for a dangerous condition
permitted to exist on the land is that the defendant "knew or in the exercise of reasonable
care should have known of said condition, and failed to exercise reasonable care to
remedy said condition . . . . " Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co.. 120 Utah 31,232 P.2d 210,
212 (1951). See also Peats v. Commercial Security Bank. 746 P.2d 1191,1192-93 (Utah
App. 1987). This language was adopted by the Utah Supreme CourtfromRestatement of
Torts § 343. The duty of the owner to exercise reasonable care to learn of dangerous
conditions is a duty to inspect the premises. A business invitee is:
entitled to expect such care not only in the original construction of the
premises, and any activities of the possessor or his employees which may
affect their condition, but also in inspection to discover their actual
condition and any latent defects, followed by such repair, safeguards, or
warning as may be reasonably necessary for his protection under the
circumstances.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 cmt. b (1964).
"The occupier must not only use care not to injure the visitor by negligent
activities, and warn him of latent dangers of which the occupier knows, but he must also
inspect the premises to discover possible dangerous conditions of which he does not
know,..." William L. Prosser, Law of Torts § 61 at 392-93 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes
omitted). In Rogalski v. Phillips Petroleum Co.. 3 Utah 2d 203,208,282 P.2d 304,307
(1955) the court expressly held that: "[t]he duty owed by an owner of land to a business
visitor is to inspect and maintain his premises in a reasonably safe condition or to warn
the visitor of any dangerous conditions existing thereon." This duty is greater than that
6

due a licensee. The difference between a business invitee and a licensee under Utah law
is that the owner of land does not owe this duty to inspect his land to discover possible
dangers to a licensee, only to a business invitee. Stevens v. Salt Lake County. 25 Utah 2nd
168,172,478 P.2d 496,498-99 (1970). See also Darrington v. Wade. 812 P.2d 452,458
(Utah App. 1991) ("Based on this standard, Wades, as owners of property intended to be
leased for public admission, had a duty to inspect the property and either take reasonable
measures to correct conditions creating a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm, or to ensure
that their tenant corrected such conditions before admitting the public onto the property.")
The duty of the University of Utah to inspect Rice Stadium is an integral part of
the plaintiffs tort claim. Ilott has not alleged that Rice Stadium was defective in its
design or construction. Rather she claims that the negligence of the defendant was in
permitting the wooden bleacher in question to become defective and not repairing,
replacing or warning of the danger. The duty to discover a danger that has arisen on the
property is a duty to inspect. If an inspection would not have discovered the latent defect,
then no cause of action has been stated. Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments. Ltd.. 754
P.2d 89, 91 (Utah App. 1988) ("Further, plaintiff did not present evidence establishing
whether defendant did or did not routinely inspect his buildings, or whether such
inspection would have put defendant on notice that a dangerous condition existed. Even
if we assume that defendant had a duty to inspect, that duty would not require discovery
of a latent defect.")
7

The trial court correctly determined that "the crux of the plaintiffs case is in fact
premised on the defendant's negligent or inadequate inspection." R. 214. That decision
should be affirmed on appeal.
Plaintiff also claims that there was an independent duty to warn of the alleged
dangerous condition. Again, plaintiff misconstrues Utah's law. The above cited cases
make it clear that the duty of the landowner is to either correct a dangerous condition or
to give adequate notice of the same. A landowner has no duty to do either until it
becomes aware that such a dangerous condition exists.
II. THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH IS IMMUNE FROM
THIS CLAIM FOR INJURIES ARISING OUT OF AN
INADEQUATE OR NEGLIGENT INSPECTION
Utah law placed upon the University of Utah a duty to inspect Rice Stadium for
the benefit of the safety and health of the members of the public who attended public
activities there as business invitees of the University. This duty was met by the
University through a massive pre-season inspection and lesser pre-game inspections to
discover and correct any dangerous conditions in the stadium. Plaintiffs claim is that the
University's inspections failed to discover and correct the dangerous state of the wooden
bleacher that gave way under her weight while she was walking on it.
It is undisputed that the University of Utah is a governmental entity that was
performing a governmental function. Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist. 849 P.2d
1162,1164 (Utah 1993). Nor is it disputed that the applicable waiver of immunity under
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which the plaintiff sues is conditioned upon the retentions of immunity found in Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1996). Plaintiff has not challenged these steps of the immunity
analysis either on appeal or in the trial court. Plaintiffs only claim is that the inspections
at issue in this action do not qualify as inspections under the express retention of
immunity for making an inadequate or negligent inspection.
This action does not involve negligent conduct by the inspector during the course
of the inspection, such as was involved in Ericksen v. Salt Lake Citv Corp., 858 P.2d 995
(Utah 1993). Instead, the plaintiff seeks recoveryfromthe defendant because the
inspections at issue failed to uncover the dangerous condition of the wooden bleacher.
This is the type of claim that this retention of immunity was intended to protect from
liability. It was intended "to immunize only the conclusions and results of an inspection
where the inspector may have overlooked something or made a faulty judgment in
deciding whether to approve or reject the subject of the inspection." Ericksen, 858 P.2d
at 998.
Nor does this action involve a question of routine maintenance like that raised in
Nixon v. Salt Lake Citv Corp., 898 P.2d 265 (Utah 1995). This is indeed a case "where
an inspector failed to determine that a particular building or piece of equipment was
unsafe for the public as a whole." Nixon, 898 P.2d at 271. The Utah Supreme Court has
not held, as plaintiff suggests, that only "professional" building inspectors are covered
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under the retention of immunity for inspections. Nor is this immunity limited to
government inspections of private property.
In Velasquez v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.. 24 Utah 2d 217,469 P.2d 5 (1970), the
court applied this retention of immunity to an alleged failure to adequately inspect the
safety devices at a railroad crossing. The State of Utah was found to be immune because
this involved an inspection and because the challenged actions had involved a
discretionary function. The trial court correctly held that plaintiffs claims were barred by
the retention of immunity for inspections.
First, the plaintiffs injuries stemfromthe incorrect conclusion reached by
the individuals who inspected the bleachers that all of the bleachers were
safe for the public using Rice Stadium. In other words, the plaintiffs
injuries resulted directly from an alleged oversight related to the actual
inspection process. The second component of public duty is also met
because the University's inspectors allegedly failed to determine that at
least one of the bleachers, which collapsed when the plaintiff stood on it,
was unsafe for public use. It is evident that the inspection of the bleachers
was undertaken to insure public health and safety. Since the plaintiffs
injuries arose as a result of incorrect conclusions and results of an
inspection which was undertaken for the public in general, the exception to
the waiver of immunity found in § 63-30-10(4) applies to bar the plaintiffs
action.
R. 218. For this reason, the trial court's dismissal of this action should be affirmed.
III. THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH IS IMMUNE FROM
INJURIES ARISING FROM A LATENT DEFECT
The University of Utah's immunity has also been retained for any injury arising
out of a "latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any public... structure." Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-10(17) (1996). A latent defect is "[a] defect which reasonably careful
10

inspection will not reveal." Vincent v. Salt Lake County. 583 P.2d 105,107 (Utah 1978);
Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments, Ltd, 754 P.2d 89, 91 n.l (Utah App. 1988).
While the plaintiff challenges the quality of the defendant's inspections, she
presented no evidence to contradict the undisputed fact that the defect in the bleacher in
question was latent and not patent. Ilott's own testimony is that she saw nothing wrong
with the wooden bleacher in question and had no reason to believe that it was defective.
Q. When you walked on those benches going up and down to visit with
your nephew and return, did you notice that any of the planks on the
benches appeared to be worn or weak or A. I didn't - with stepping, I didn't feel anything give way. They were just
- they all looked the same. I - you know, they're kind of weathered, and
they've been out in the weather. I wasn't really expecting anything to
happen. I was quite surprised when my foot went down through. It really
took me by surprise. I didn't really notice anything going up. And I didn't
feel anything going down. And I didn't notice any cracks or anything.
R.59.
Q. As you walked along the bleachers to meet your nephew and then back
to the - where you were sitting, did the bleachers appear to be safe to stand
on?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you observe anything in the condition of the bleachers that made
you suspect that they wouldn't support your weight?
A. No.
R.69.
Q. Okay. Anything else? I'm just asking you about your own inspection.
Could you see thatfromyour inspection of the bleachers as you elected to
walk up those bleachers that they were weathered and worn and likely to
collapse?
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A. They looked-they didn't look dangerous. They didn't look like they
would collapse. I certainly was surprised when they did. They just-how
would you describe it? They're bleachers that are out there.
Q. Okay.
A. I didn't observe anything that looked like it wouldn't support my
weight. I didn't observe anything that looked like it would be unsafe.
Q. Okay. That was both on your way up and on your way back down?
A. Yeah.
R.70
Just as the plaintiff could see no patent defect in the wooden bleacher before the
accident, the defendant's inspections also found no such defect. No evidence was
presented that showed that a reasonably careful inspection would have led to the
discovery of the latently dangerous or defective condition of the wooden bleacher in
question. The duty to inspect does not include the duty to discover a latent defect.
Gregory, 754 P.2d at 91. Without such evidence the University of Utah's motion for
summary judgment was well taken under § 63-30-10 (17) and the dismissal of this action
should be affirmed on these ground as well.
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, defendant University of Utah asks this Court to
affirm the dismissal of this action.
DEFENDANT DOES NOT DESIRE ORAL ARGUMENT
OR A PUBLISHED OPINION
The defendant-appellee does not request oral argument and a published opinion in
this matter. The questions raised in this appeal are not such that oral argument or a

12

published opinion are necessary, though the defendant desires to participate in oral
argument if such is held by the Court.
Respectfully submitted this

of April, 2000.

BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant-Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact copies of the foregoing Brief of
Defendant-Appellee, postage prepaid, to the following on this the S
2000:

PETER C.COLLINS
TARA L.ISAACSON
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C.
623 East 2100 South 84106
Attorneys for PlaintifFAppellant
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ADDENDUM "A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LINDA ILOTT,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 960906196

vs.
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH,
Defendant.

This case came before me for hearing on defendant University
of Utah's Motion for Summary Judgment on May 18,:;1959^f: ; I then;took
the matter under advisement. Since then, I have examined the legal
authorities cited by counsel

in support of their respective

positions and considered counsels' oral argument. For tne reasons
stated below, I grant defendant's motion based on my conclusion
that the conduct of the defendant claimed to be actionable arose
from an inspection for which the University, as a governmental
entity, is immune from suit.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND

00210
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The plaintiff alleges that on October 29, 1994, she attended
a football game at Rice Stadium, a facility owned by the defendant.
The plaintiff was returning to her seat when one of the planks used
as bleacher seats in the north end-zone collapsed as she stepped on
it, injuring her.
In support of their Motion, the University presents the
Affidavit of Gary Ratliff, who notes that

w

[e]ach summer before

football season begins, the University does a visual and weight
inspection of all of the bleachers and seats in the Rice Stadium."
(Affidavit of Gary Ratliff at para. 1) .

The plaintiff contests

Mr. Ratliff's assertion that each of the three planks of every
bleacher was visually or weight

inspected by citing to the

deposition testimony of Steven Pyne that he did not have specific
recollection of conducting any inspections and repairs immediately
prior to the October 29, 1994, football game. (Deposition of Steven
Pyne at pp. 32-33).

Mr. Pyne's deposition testimony creates an

issue of fact concerning the scope of the defendant's inspection,
but it is an issue which is rendered immaterial by Utah Code
Annotated §63-30-10(4).

0091'
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LEGAL ANALYSIS
The

defendant

contends

that

the

governmental

immunity

provisions of Utah Code Annotated §63-30-10(4) and (17) bar the
plaintiff's lawsuit.

Section 63-30-10(4) provides as follows:

Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for injury proximately
caused by a negligent act or omission of an
employee committed within the scope of
employment except if the injury arises out of:

(4) a failure to make an inspection or by
making an inadequate or negligent inspection.
The defendant asserts if its inspection should have disclosed a
defective bleacher, then it is immune under subsection 4 because
the plaintiff's injuries arose out of its "failure to make an
inspection or by making an inadequate or negligent inspection."
In

response

to

the

defendant's

immunity

argument,

the

plaintiff suggests, unfortunately without discussion or analysis,
that paragraph (4) does not apply because her claims do not involve
a failure to inspect or negligent inspection. After reviewing the
plaintiff's Complaint and the record developed pursuant to the

ILOTT V. U OF U
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University's Motion, I am persuaded when the plaintiff's claim that
the University breached its duty to keep Rice Stadium safe and
well-maintained

is coupled with the undisputed fact that the

University conducted regular inspections of the bleacher planks,
inspection immunity bars plaintiff's suit as a matter of law.
The plaintiff herself supplies the primary impetus for my
determination that her claims are subject to inspection immunity in
her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment ("Memorandum").

The legal authority cited by plaintiff as

"most instructive with respect to the issues before this Court" is
quoted with emphasis for the proposition that

xx

[The defendant] was

in the actual possession of the building ana naci a duty to searcn
out defects in the premises in order that they be reasonably safe
for the presence of business visitors." Memorandum, at 9,10, citing
Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co. . 232 P.2d 210 (Utah 1951).

The*

inspections of the bleachers conducted by the University were
undertaken

in clear

recognition

of

the

duty

articulated

in

Erickson. Since the weakened condition of the plank that failed
beneath Ms. Ilott was not apparent, she could only establish the

ILOTT V. U OF U
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University's negligence by proving that a reasonable inspection
would have revealed its true condition.

Accordingly, the crux of

the plaintiff's case is in fact premised on the defendant's
negligent or inadequate inspection.
Having determined that the plaintiff's claims are based on the
theory of negligent inspection, I turn to the question of whether
the defendant's inspection of the bleachers falls within the ambit
of immunity granted under paragraph (4). The Utah Supreme Court
has addressed the scope of paragraph (4) in two cases: Ericksen v.
Salt Lake City Corp., 858 P.2d 995 (Utah 1993), and Nixon v. Salt
Lake City Corp. . 898 P.2d 265 (Utah 1995) .

Each of these cases

pares back the application of inspection immunity in different
ways.
In Ericksen, the court decided whether immunity should be
granted

when

the

negligent

conduct

incidental to the actual inspection.

complained

of

occurred

The court indicated that

"[t]he question of whether a governmental entity is liable for the
negligent inspection of property most frequently arises when the
entity undertakes inspections to assure compliance with building,

ILOTT V. U OF U
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fire, electric and other safety codes."

Id. at 997 (citing 57A

Am.Jur.2d Negligence §376 (1989)). The court also noted its belief
that "the legislature intended to preserve a narrow immunity for
inspections to allow inspectors to perform their work without fear
that an oversight which later causes injury would give rise to
liability on the part of a governmental entity."

Id. at 998. The

court held that immunity related to negligent inspection "was
intended to immunize only the conclusions and results of an
inspection where the inspector may have overlooked something or
made a faulty judgment in deciding whether to approve or reject the
subject of the inspection." Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, under
Ericksen, the first component of immunity for negligent inspection
is that inspectors who conduct themselves negligently while making
an

inspection

are

not

immunized

-

the

Ericksen

inspector

negligently opened the wrong overhead door while conducting^the •
inspection of a building under construction dislodging a ladder
which was placed against the door and injuring the* worker who
occupied it -

while inspectors that reach incorrect conclusions

and results from an inspection enjoy immunity.
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In Nixon, court restricted the reach of inspection immunity
by denominating the failure to identify and repair faulty cleaning
equipment as a shortcoming in maintenance and not inspection.

The

court determined that this was not a case "where an inspector
failed

to determine

that a particular building

or piece of

equipment was unsafe for the public as whole." Id. at 269,

In

reaching this decision, the court discussed the genesis of immunity
for negligent inspection as being the "public duty doctrine" which
ux

operates to disallow recovery by individuals for such inspections

on the ground that the [inspection] was intended to protect the
general public, and to provide a means of enforcing a third-party's
duty to repair defects, rather than to protect"va particular
individual or class of individuals.'"
Negligence §376) (Emphasis added).

Id. (citing 57A Am. Jur. 2d

Therefore, while the Ericksen

court reiterated its view that the inspection immunity is to~be%<
parceled out parsimoniously, it is properly invoked where the
inspection is undertaken to safeguard the general public.
Various

rationales

for the public

duty

doctrine exist.

Foremost among them is the notion that the governments interest in
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safeguarding the public interest predominates over the interests of
any one

individual.

The Utah Supreme

Court

in Gillman v.

Department of Financial Institutions. 782 P.2d 506, 513 ^(Utah
1989), discussed the reasoning behind the public duty doctrine in
the context of immunity granted in connection with the issuance,
denial, suspension, or revocation of licenses. The court quoted 4
California

Law Revision

Commfn, Reports, Recommendations

and

Studies 817-18 (1963):
'"Public entities and public employees should not be
liable for failure to make arrests or otherwise to
enforce any law. They should not be liable for failing to
inspect persons or property adequately to determine
compliance with health and safety regulations*. Nor should
they be liable for negligent or wrongful, issuance or
revocation of licenses and permits. The'government has
undertaken these activities to insure public health and
safety. To provide the utmost public protection,
governmental entities should not be dissuaded from
engaging in such activities by the fear that liability
may be imposed if an employee performs his duties
inadequately. Moreover, if liability existed for this
type of activity, the risk exposure to which a public
entity would be subject would include virtually all
activities going on within the community. There would be
potential governmental liability for all building
defects, for all crimes, and for all outbreaks of
contagious disease. No private person is subjected to
risks of this magnitude.... Far more persons would suffer
if government did not perform these functions at all than
would be benefitted by permitting recovery in those cases
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shown

to

have

performed

Id. at 513.
Pursuant to the analytical model established in Ericksen and
Nixon,

I

conclude

that

the

defendant

components of immunity for inspection.
injuries

stem

from

the

incorrect

has

established

both

First, the plaintiff's

conclusion

reached

by the

individuals who inspected the bleachers that all of the bleachers
were safe for the public using Rice Stadium.

In other words, the

plaintiff's injuries resulted directly from an alleged oversight
related to the actual inspection process. The second component of
public duty is also met because the University/s

inspectors

allegedly failed to determine that at least one of the bleachers,
which collapsed when the plaintiff stood on it, was unsafe for
public use. It is evident that the inspection of the bleachers was
undertaken

to

insure

public

health

and

safety.

Since

the

plaintiff's injuries arose as a result of incorrect conclusions and
results of an inspection which was undertaken for the public in
general, the exception to the waiver of immunity found in §63-3010(4) applies to bar the plaintiff's action.
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Counsel for the defendant is to prepare an Order consistent
with this Memorandum Decision.
Dated this / ( day of July, 1999.

RONALD E. NEHRING
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

ILOTT V. U OF U

PAGE 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this \ \

day of

July, 1999:

James E. Morton
Attorney for Plaintiff
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Valden P. Livingston
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LINDA ILOTT,
Plaintiff,

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH,
Defendant.

Civil No. 960906196 PI
Judge Ronald E. Nehring

Defendant University of Utah's Motion for Summary Judgment
was heard by the court on May 18, 1999 at 9:00 a.m. before the
Honorable Ronald E. Nehring.

Plaintiff was represented by Peter

Collins, and Defendant was represented by J. Wesley Robinson.
Having considered the pleadings, record, and other documents
submitted, and hearing the arguments of counsel for the parties,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. For the reasons set forth in the court's Memorandum
Decision dated July 19, 1999, Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted, and Plaintiff's action is dismissed with
prejudice and on the merits.

DATED this

z$

day of

1999.

RONALD
DISTRIC

APPROVED

TO FORM:

PETER COLLINS
Attorney for Plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
this

/o

day of

QMJ^CMJ'

, 1999 to the following:

Peter Collins
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C.
4021 South 700 East, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
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